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Abstract
The resurgent interest in the role of infrastructure on development, spurred by the work on
Aschauer in the late eighties, has produced a voluminous research activity, both at national
and regional levels. Even though the majority of this research is based on production function
analysis, more recently has emerged the alternative analytical framework of duality theory and
cost function analysis. The latter is utilised here, in an effort to investigate public capital’s
impact on manufacturing at the regional level (Greek prefectures). Public capital categories
have been grouped to two major categories of ‘productive’ and ‘social’ infrastructure. The
latter seems to play little role in reducing private costs, but the former appears to be an
important cost reduction influence. It can also be demonstrated that infrastructure has a
substitutional relationship with labour and intermediate inputs, and a complementary one with
private capital.
1. Introduction
In the last decade or so interest in the effect of public infrastructure on national and regional
economies has generated a voluminous literature. The renewed debate was sparked by the
works of Ratner (1983), and especially Aschauer (1987; 1988; 1989a) about the way in which
US public capital has affected development and productivity. Despite the fact that there are
numerous examples of similar research, both from the United States and other countries, the
term public infrastructure capital (here used interchangeably with the terms public capital,
public infrastructure, or just infrastructure) remains problematic. It tends to have different
meanings in different contexts as the introduction to definitional issues on infrastructure by
Diamond and Spence (1989) indicates.
Most empirical work is based on a production function approach. This research has generated
results which have both corroborated Aschauer’s thesis that infrastructure plays a significantly
positive role on the private sector’s productivity (thereby advocating the extension of public
investment programmes), and rejected it (proposing the extensive implementation of ‘user
fees’ on infrastructure use). Section two of this paper provides a compendium of this
theoretical debate, as well as the basic research findings to date. However, and more
important, in the present context, it also introduces some examples of an alternative analytical
framework - that of cost function analysis. The next section delineates, in detail, duality theory
and cost function analysis. It also provides the theoretical tools, derived from this approach,
by which the effects of public capital on the private sector can be measured. The paper then
describes the Public Investment Programme (PIPR) which has been the main source for public
infrastructure investment in Greece. Section five presents an empirical calibration within this
particular theoretical framework and the results obtained for the secondary sector2
(manufacturing) at the prefectural level (EU regional level: NUTS III) in Greece between
1982 and 1991. The last part summarises the main findings of the analysis.
2. Infrastructure and the economic performance of the private sector: context.
Amongst the main questions in regional analysis are the determinants of regional growth and
the role of the state in its promotion. One of the tools of regional development policy, either
used implicitly or explicitly, is the public investment in infrastructure capital. The interest for
the study of the public capital’s impact on national and regional economies was intense after
the Second World War given that the existing infrastructure was seriously damaged in many
countries, and especially in Europe. This sparked a theoretical research debate that provided
some serious insights for the mechanisms by which infrastructure affects development.
Even though the aforementioned research had shed some light into the links between
infrastructure and development, serious obstacles, at both the theoretical and applied research
level, have since remained for a fuller understanding of what has proved such a complex
relationship. The mechanics of the links were (and still are to a certain degree) left still to be
unveiled, and in many cases even the definition of ‘public (infrastructure) capital’ seemed
problematic. But even if the theoretical and definitional problems were circumvented, it was
difficult to measure with accuracy even the basic notion of the capacity of infrastructure at
regional or national levels. It is worth mentioning at this point the work of the EU group of
researchers, convened by Biehl, set up to evaluate the contribution of infrastructure to the
development of European regions (Biehl 1986), which was one of the most serious attempts to
address these issues at the sub-national level. This attempt was founded on the physical
measurement of public capital’s stock. However, despite the potential advantages of this
approach, it is difficult (and costly) to construct such measures, and even more so to replicate
such measurements frequently. An additional difficulty is the depiction of the qualitative
characteristics of the existing stock. The alternative approach to infrastructure capacity
measurement – that based on a monetary measure - assumed dominance during the resurgence
of research into the role of public capital in the late eighties-early nineties.
The most notable example of the monetary approach was seen in the research of Aschauer
(1987; 1988; 1989a). This work had such influence that it initiated a whole-renewed interest
on the effects of the public infrastructure
i. The research contained in these papers attempted to
answer one of the great theoretical questions that had baffled economists and other scientists
working at sub-national scales, which is why there had been a significant slowdown of the
growth in US productivity. During the seventies there was an unprecedented decline of labour
productivity growth, and even though there has been a slight recovery of this growth rate
during the eighties, the fact remains that it is still significantly lower than the average for the
post-war period. Several explanations have been proposed for the productivity growth
slowdown, such as the energy crisis, changes in the nation’s demographic characteristics and
educational attainments of the labour force, the decrease in the rate of capital investment, and
the sectoral shift away from manufacturing, etc
ii.
However, Aschauer attributed the productivity slowdown to the decline of the public
infrastructure investment in the US. He introduced public capital into a Cobb-Douglas
production function, along to the other factors of production process (labour and private
capital). The overall conclusion was that the level of public capital provision significantly
affects the productivity of the private sector in the world’s leading economy (1989a, 1989c).
He reached a similar conclusion using data for other major national economies (1989b). One3
salient feature of these studies is that while public investment has a positive association with
productivity, other public spending - such as public consumption - has a negative one. He also
argued that different categories of infrastructure have different impacts on the performance of
the private sector. It is those categories that he classified as ‘core’ infrastructure (highways,
airports, mass transit, electrical and gas facilities, water, sewers) that have the most
fundamental impact (1989a).
The idea that infrastructure can have such an impact on the private sector productivity has
generated a vigorous debate, and voluminous applied research. Munnell’s (1990a) results
supported Aschauer’s thesis, even though in her research infrastructure seems to have had a
more moderate causal effect. She also provided a regional dimension to the research on public
capital for the US, where the overall influence of infrastructure provision remains the same
(1990b). On the other hand, in a number of important papers Holtz-Eakin (1992, 1993a,
1993c) argued that the causation of the relationship between public capital and productivity is
the reverse than that identified by Aschauer and Munnell. His view was that the post-war
period of high productivity growth, which the American economy had experienced, resulted in
an unprecedented economic growth, which in turn gave to the federal and state governments
the fiscal ability to undertake substantial infrastructure projects. It was, he argued, the decline
of productivity during the seventies that had, as a result, a budgetary constraint at all levels of
government. As many of the consumption expenditures are inelastic, programmes of
infrastructure investment were cut down or postponed. He also thinks that the same argument
of reverse causation can be applied at the regional level. Holtz-Eakin dismissed Munnell’s
regional analysis arguing that it is the fiscal ability of ‘richer’ American states to undertake
public investment that has endowed them with a better stock of infrastructure, and not the
reverse (Holtz-Eakin 1993a).
There are numerous examples of subsequent similar research from the US, as well as from
many other countries. Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1992), specifying a regional production
function, at first supported Aschauer’s argument. However, in a more recent paper, where
more elaborate techniques were employed, they reject their initial results (Garcia-Mila et. al.
1996). The role of infrastructure is also insignificant according to Kelejian and Robinson
(1994). It has to be noted that in their most recent work with even more elaborate econometric
techniques, the spatial dimension of the data is examined exhaustively, and again concluding
that model specification can play a crucial role as to the results obtained (1997). Tatom (1991,
1993) also supported the argument that rejects the positive role of infrastructure in
productivity growth and Dalenberg and Partridge (1994) report similar conclusions. For the
reverse argument, Pinnoi (1995), estimating a translog production function reached positive
results for the role of infrastructure. The results reported from international comparisons
regarding the role of public capital have also been inconclusive. Aschauer (1989b) found a
positive effect, Ford and Poret (1991) reached ambiguous results, and Evans and Karras
(1994) did not find any impact at all for infrastructure capital. Positive results, however,
derive from Japanese research, as evidenced by the pioneering work of Mera (1975) and from
the more recent research of Miyawaki and Tobita (1992), and Okhawara and Yamano (1997).
Prud’homme (1996) also reported positive results for the French case and infrastructure seems
to play a positive role also in Spain according to Cutanda and Paricio (1994), and Mas et. al.
(1996). But the findings have been inconclusive for the Netherlands (Sturm and de Haan,
1995).
The production function analysis dominance of the infrastructure debate, however, is not
uncontested. An alternative analytical framework is provided by the duality theory and cost4
function approach. In production function analysis, output is considered as endogenous, and
the production inputs as exogenous. Cost function analysis is based on the dual cost function
of the (primal) production function. This former embodies all the parameters of the latter, but
with a crucial difference. In cost function analysis, it is input quantities and production costs
which are endogenous, and the level of output and input prices that are exogenous. (For a
concise historical presentation of the cost function approach see Berndt (1991) and for a more
extended analysis see, for example, Diewert
iii (1986) and Chambers (1988).
There is now, in existence, a substantial body of work on the effects of infrastructure using the
cost function approach. In the US, Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994) using a panel of industrial
sectors found that public capital had a positive impact on private sector productivity. Lynde
and Richmond (1992, and 1993a) and Morrison and Schwartz (1992, and 1996) have also
reported beneficial effects of the provision of US infrastructure. Similar research has been
conducted in Europe. Berndt and Hansson (1991a) have investigated the Swedish case, Lynde
and Richmond (1993b) looked at the UK, Conrad and Seitz (1994) provided a sectoral
analysis for Germany, Seitz and Licht (1995) focused on a regional analysis for the (West)
German states, and Seitz (1993 and 1994) analysed the effects of the total public capital and
road infrastructure respectively. In all these cases, infrastructure capital appears to have, once
again, a positive role regarding the private sector’s costs and productivity.
3. From production functions to cost functions and duality theory.
The analytical framework of production functions can be extended with duality theory if it is
assumed that firms in the private sector choose input quantities in such way that they
minimize the cost of their production process, given the prices of these inputs. Let the
production function be:
Yf L K M G t ii i ii i = (, , , , ) (1)
where, Yi is the output (value added) in sector i, Li is the labour input, Ki is the private capital
input, Gi is public capital input, and t is a time counter which functions as a proxy for
disembodied technical change. The subscript i is a regional index.
Then the cost function of an industry in region i will be:
CC w p p Y G t ii i k m i i = (,,,,, ) (2)
where Ci is the private cost of production in sector i, wi is the wage in sector i, pk is the rental
price of private capital, pm is the price of intermediate inputs, and the others are as above.
Cost function (2) can be derived by minimising the private production cost function:
Cw Lp Kp M ii i k i i i =++ (3)
subject to the production function (1).
From cost equation (2) is possible to derive the cost minimising factor demand equations
using Shephard’s Lemma (see for instance Takayama (1985) or Chambers (1988)) for labour
L
*
i, private capital K
*
i, and intermediate inputs M
*
i. These equations would be:5
LC w ii i
* / =¶ ¶ (4)
KC p ii k
* / =¶ ¶ (5)
MC p ii m
* / =¶ ¶ (6)
The private costs of production for the optimising firms, using the left-hand side of equations
(4)-(6), would be:
Cw Lp Kp M ii i k i m i =++
** * (7a)
or, using the right hand sides, which is the application of Shephard’s lemma, of equations (4)-














































Li k Ki m Mi =- - -            (7b)
        =++= - sss s Li Ki Mi Gi (7c)
A measure of the impact of public capital on private cost is the cost elasticity with respect to
public infrastructure (eCG). This elasticity can be construed as the degree of how much
infrastructure capital will reduce the costs of industries operating in the region. More formally,
eCG is the percentage change of the private cost of production as a result of a unitary change in
























Closely linked with cost elasticity with respect to public infrastructure (eCG) is the concept of
the ‘shadow value’ of public capital. As the flow of services from public capital can be
considered as a free public good, there is no market price for these services
iv. Nevertheless, it
is possible to have an estimate of their shadow value
v (sGi). The shadow value of public capital
is a measure of the impact on private cost of an exogenous change in the level of services
delivered by public capital, ceteris paribus. It shows private sector willingness to pay in order











If there is such an exogenous increase in infrastructure services, it is expected that there will
be a corresponding increase in private sector productivity (¶¶ YG ii / ³ 0). The value eCG is6
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It is also possible to have a measure of infrastructure’s impact on the private input shares
(labour, private capital, or intermediate input) to production. If an increase (or decrease, or no
change) of the stock of public capital has an effect of an increase (or decrease, or no change)
of a private factor of production, then it can be argued that infrastructure is using this input (or
saving it or has a neutral effect, respectively). A measure of the this cost share change is the
‘factor bias effect’ (see Nadiri and Mamuneas, 1994), and the respective effects in the case of


















                       (12)








                      (13)
The total infrastructure effect on the demand for private inputs can be estimated using private
























  (where QX = the quantity of inputs L, K, M)             (14)
In an applied research context, these elasticities can be estimated directly from the respective
cost elasticities, and the factor bias effect over share, as private input elasticities are the sum
of these former measures. Put differently, the total impact of public capital on input demand
(eXG) is the sum of the productivity effect (cost elasticities) and factor bias effect. If a private
input elasticity, with respect to public infrastructure (eXG), has a positive sign (or negative, or7
zero), then public infrastructure has a complementary (or substitutive, or neutral) relationship
with the respective private input component.
4. Public infrastructure capital in the regions of Greece.
The Public Investment Programme (PIPR) has been the primary channel of public investment
in Greece since 1952. The PIPR has financed the great bulk of infrastructure projects both at
the national and the regional level. Sub-national data are available from 1976 onwards.
The PIPR comprises by several categories of public investment according to end use, for
example related to industry, transportation, education, health, water supply, etc. For analytical
reasons these categories have been grouped into three major headings. One such group is
made up of those categories that in infrastructure research are usually classified as
‘productive’ public capital
vi. These are the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery, Industry, Energy
and Handicrafts, Irrigation, Research and Technology, Special Works (plus those of
Athens/Thessaloniki), Transportation (plus those for Railways), Water/Sewage Works, and
Prefectural Works/Programmes categories of the PIPR. A second group includes those
categories which usually would be classified as ‘social’ infrastructure, such as Education,
Health and Welfare, Housing, Public Administration, and Tourism. The last group is those
categories that are, in reality, operational expenditures of the PIPR, and are not materialised as
‘real’ public investment. These categories have been excluded from the subsequent analysis.
In 1992 the productive category’s share of total expenditure was around 78 percent, the social
component made up a further 17 percent, and the remaining 5 percent comprises
miscellaneous and administrative expenditures categories.
An interesting feature of the evolution of infrastructure expenditure is the fact that during the
late-seventies and early-eighties the real investment part of PIPR decreased from its. However,
this tendency was reversed during the eighties, and the total real investment expenditure of the
programme increased to return to the mid-seventies level.
The greatest part of PIPR is allocated regionally at the prefectural level (NUTS III level
according to the EU classification). However, another part of PIPR investment is directed to
inter-prefectural projects (NUTS II level) and these investment projects have not been
included in this analysis In this sense, the infrastructure stocks used here underestimate the
real public capital stock. The public capital stocks were estimated using the perpetual
inventory method:
GG I tt t =- + - () 1 1 d            (15)
where  Gt is the end-of-year public capital stock in year t,  d is the geometric rate of
depreciation, and It is real investment in public capital during years t. For more details on the
method see for example Holtz-Eakin, (1993b)
vii.
The data for the private sector refer to ‘large scale’ manufacturing. These data are the only
available at the prefectural level supplied by the Statistical Service of Greece
viii. Large scale
manufacturing in the Greek context is any industry that employs twenty or more persons. This
scale of manufacturing amount to almost 90 percent of the total secondary sector in Greece.
The private capital stocks were constructed in the same way as their public sector
counterparts. These private stocks are used here as a proxy for the quantity (K) of private
capital input8
It is helpful to understand as context that during the eighties industry in Greece had to
confront a deep crisis. This can be seen in the persistent decline of average annual
employment since 1986. But probably the most salient feature of the crisis was the huge
decline in levels of private investment. By the late eighties, gross asset formation in
manufacturing has lost around one fourth of the levels reached in the mid-seventies. This is all
in complete contrast to an opposite trend ongoing in public capital investment, in which the
real part of the PIPR spend has stayed stable or has been modestly increased during the same
period
5. Estimation of regional infrastructure cost functions in Greece.
There are several empirical forms that the general cost function can take. According to Berndt
(1991) in his review of the history of the development of such functional forms, it was
Diewert who first introduced the generalised Leontief form, which is used in infrastructure
research by Berndt and Hansson (1991) for Sweden and Seitz (1993;1994) for Germany. An
alternative form is the translog cost function, used by Conrad and Seitz (1994), and Seitz and
Licht (1995) for sectoral and regional analyses of the role of German public capital
respectively. Another potential empirical form for the cost function is that used by Nadiri and
Mamuneas (1994) in their analysis of the effects of public infrastructure on US
manufacturing. This exact form has been used in part in the subsequent analysis as a full
translog calibration and it has to be reported that it generates rather poor results (insignificant
t-ratios for some of the estimated variables), even without the introduction of public capital
into the equation. There will be more on the alternative specifications later.
The cost function used here, has the following form:
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(for definitions, see section 3)
The respective cost share equations then would be:
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It is also possible to have a third share equation - that for intermediate inputs (sM). However,
as the cost shares add to unity (sL + sK + sM =1), it is necessary to exclude one of the cost share
equations, because otherwise the system of equations would be singular
ix. The system of
equations that is estimated comprises the set (16)-(18)
x This is the homogeneity restriction for
the estimated system. An additional set of restrictions, regarding symmetry conditions across
equations (16)-(18), has also been imposed. For instance, the coefficient bKL obtained by the
cost share equation (17) has been constrained to be equal to coefficient bKL obtained by the
cost share equation (18), and to bLK obtained by the cost function (16). The parameters for the
excluded equation, dealing with the cost share of intermediate inputs, can be derived from the
estimated parameters of the cost equation and the labour and private capital share equations,
given the aforementioned restrictions.
It is assumed that the error terms in equations (16)-(18) (uC, uL, and uK respectively) are
jointly normally distributed with zero expected value, and also that the covariance matrix is
positive definite symmetric. The estimation method selected is that of iterative seemingly
unrelated regression (SUR)
xi. It has also to be noted that the parameter estimates obtained with
the SUR method are „numerically equivalent to those of the maximum likelihood estimator“
(see Berndt 1991, p. 463).
As the analysis is based on a panel of regional data, the estimated set of equations has to be
calibrated in such a way that ensures that the specific nature of the dataset has been taken into
consideration. Thus, every equation of the system (16)-(18) has been appended with a set of
regional-specific dummies Di (where i is a regional indicator, and the regional dummy is equal
to one in region i, and zero in all other regions). Such a formulation is necessary in order to
capture the regionally specific characteristics (see, for instance, Hsiao 1986, or Baltagi 1995).
One component of the infrastructure research literature, where comparable datasets have been
employed for the estimation of similar sets of equations, extended the use of dummy variables
such as these to the cases of aL,i, and aK,i coefficients (see Nadiri and Mamuneas, 1994; Seitz,
1993, 1994; Seitz and Licht, 1995). Such a formulation has also been followed here, as it
ensures that the labour and private capital demand equations can be consistently derived by
the cost equation.
Even though a cost equation similar in form to that of Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994) is used
here, there is one significant difference. Here there is no a priori assumption that there are
constant returns of scale (CRS). In contrast to the Nadiri and Mamuneas approach, a CRS
variant is compared to a version without such a restriction. Such a comparison has been
proposed and tested by Seitz (1994) and, in a regional context, by Seitz and Licht (1995). In
order to compare the two versions, with and without the CRS restriction, a log-likelihood ratio
test (LRT) has been used. The LRT is a rather simple test, which can be briefly described as
follows: if the values of the maximised log-likelihood functions are lnLr for the restricted, and
lnLu for the unrestricted model, then the likelihood ratio statistic is given by:
l=- - 2(ln ln ) LL ru            (19)
This statistic is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared, and the degrees of freedom are
equal to the imposed number of restrictions
xii. The LRT has been also used here to compare
the unrestricted model with regional dummy variables to an alternative specification where
such variables have been excluded. Following Seitz (1994) and Seitz and Licht (1995), the10
log-likelihood ratio test has also been utilised in order to discern if the public capital variable
should be included in the estimated equations or not. Again, the unrestricted model is the one
with the inclusion of infrastructure, and the restricted the version is without public capital.
The dataset used in this analysis is a panel with a time dimension from 1982 to 1991, and a
cross-sectional vector of 49 prefectures. There are 51 prefectures in the Greek administrative
and statistical system (the semi-autonomous prefecture of Agion Oros is not counted).
However in Lefkada, based on unpublished data provided by the Statistical Service of Greece,
there was, in fact, no industrial activity at the scale analysed here during the period. Also in
Kephalonia industrial activity of this scale only commenced in 1984 and for this reason the
figures for both public investment and private sector characteristics were added to the adjacent
prefecture of Zakynthos. Hence, the number of prefectures in the analysis is reduced from
fifty-one to forty-nine.
The economic variables that enter the cost function representing the private sector have been
constructed as follows. The quantity of labour (L) is the total working hours in manufacturing
in prefecture i. Total working hours, in turn, were estimated by multiplying the average annual
employment in the manufacturing industry by the number of hours worked 
xiii. The price of the
labour input (wi) has been calculated by dividing the total remuneration
xiv of labour input in
prefectural industry i by the quantity of labour input (L). It has to be noted that wi enters the
system of equations normalised to equal one for the first year of the panel.
Private capital stocks for prefectural manufacturing have been used as a proxy for the quantity
of private capital input (K). The estimation method is again via the method of perpetual
inventory accounting:
KK I P it p it it =- + - () 1 1 d            (20)
where, Kit is the end-of-year private capital stock in year t in prefecture i, dp is the geometric
rate of depreciation, and IPit is real investment in private capital during years t in prefecture i.
Even though there is not a price for private capital, in the sense that a price can be defined for
the labour or intermediate inputs, a user cost of capital pK can be calculated as follows:
pr q Kp K =+ () d            (21)
where,  dp is as in equation (20), r is the long-term lending rate for the industrial sector
(nominal, referring to loans for more than a year), and qK is the investment deflator for capital
goods
xv. This capital goods investment deflator is a weighted measure of the national price
indexes of building and equipment investment in manufacturing
xvi. The price of private capital
(pK) has been normalised to be equal to one for the first year of the panel -1982.
The quantity of intermediate inputs M is the sum of materials, energy, and services that were
consumed during the production process, divided by the price index of intermediate inputs
(pm). This index is a weighted average of the raw materials and semi-finished products index,
and fuel and lubricant index (again obtained from the Statistical Service of Greece). The price
index of intermediate inputs is also normalised to be equal to one for the first year of the
panel.11
Output quantity is estimated as the total value of gross regional manufacturing output divided
by the output price index. This is the final products index as provided by the Statistical
Service of Greece, normalised here to be equal to one for 1982.
The cost variable (C) is the sum of the cost of the labour input (L * wi), private capital input
(K * pk), and intermediate inputs (M * pm). The value SL is the percentage of the labour input
to the total cost, while SK is the percentage of private capital, and the SM the percentage of
intermediate inputs.
As it is mentioned earlier, the estimation model consists of the cost equation (16), and the
share equations (17) and (18), for labour and private capital inputs, respectively. Table 1
presents the results from the estimation of the system of equations, where productive public
capital has been included
xvii, as well as the test statistics from the comparison of this
specification to alternative formulations.
The ‘fitness’ measures appear to be satisfactory, either in terms of explained variance or
standard errors, for the equations of the system. However, the coefficients for aG, bLK, bLT,
bKT, and bYT appear not to be statistically significant. The last part of table 1 gives the results
from the comparisons of the formulation with public infrastructure, fixed effects, and without
the restriction of constant returns to scale, to alternative formulations. The comparison with a
specification without fixed effects (region-specific dummy variables) gives a value for LRTD
as 2,076.86 (with 147 degrees of freedom). For the formulation where public infrastructure
has been excluded LRTG is 76.02 (with 3 degrees of freedom), and for the alternative where
the assumption of constant returns to scale is imposed LRTY is 137.26 (with 4 degrees of
freedom). In all cases the alternative specifications have been rejected decisively (the
associated probability value is 0.000).
It has to be mentioned that a similar analysis was conducted to generate results for the social
category of public capital. Again the formulation with social infrastructure and regional fixed
effects (the unrestricted model) was tested against a formulation with public capital but
without fixed effects (LRTD), one with fixed effects but no public capital (LRTG), and one
similar to the unrestricted version but with no constant returns to scale imposed (LRTY). The
assumption that social public capital is a part of the estimated system has to be rejected in
favour of the alternative hypothesis (LRTG = 4.72 , with 3 degrees of freedom). For this
reason all of the subsequent analysis presented here refers only to productive public capital
(henceforth just public capital).
As mentioned earlier, the effect of public capital on regional manufacturing can be estimated
using the cost elasticity with respect to public infrastructure (eCG). The results for the different
prefectures of the analysis are presented in table 3. In all cases the sign of the prefectural cost
elasticity is negative, which means that infrastructure tends to reduce the manufacturing costs
in all cases. However, this cost reduction seems rather small and certainly is without
significant regional variation. The highest cost elasticity is that of Zakynthos-Kephalonia (-
0.071), followed by Ioannina (-0.066). Low values area recorded for Chios (with -0.059), and
Evros, Kozani, and Serres (-0.058). It is somewhat disappointing to discern no clear pattern in
these elasticities. It is also difficult to compare these results to the findings of other research,
as there are few similar analyses at the regional level. In the research conducted by Seitz and
Licht (1995), the 11 (West) Germany states (Bundesländer) are far larger than the Greek
prefectures. (Bavaria is not much smaller than Greece as a whole, both in geographical and
economic terms.) All German regions appear to have significantly larger cost elasticities, and12
for Berlin and Bremen alone are the figures similar to those of Greek prefectures. It has to be
noted, however, that it is likely that the fact that the regional data refer only to aggregate
manufacturing has played an important role Similar results obtained from a sectoral
breakdown have given much higher cost elasticities for infrastructure in Greece at the national
scale.
The effect of infrastructure on the cost shares of the production inputs is measured by the
factor bias effects, which are equal to the coefficients of private inputs to public capital, bLG
and bKG respectively for labour and capital, plus the derived coefficient bMG for intermediate
inputs. Table 4 presents these effects divided by the corresponding private input share,
following the form of presentation favoured by Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994). The overall
result from a first look at these figures is that for all prefectures public capital appears to be
labour and intermediate inputs saving, and private capital using. The first column of table 4
(biasLG) gives the estimations
xviii for labour input. The highest values (that is the greatest cost
reduction) appear to be in Korinthia (biasLG = -0.589), Lasithi (-0.482), and Laconia (-0.370).
The lowest values are those for Kyklades (-0.051), Grevena (-0.096), and Drama (-0.100).
There is no discernible spatial pattern in these figures. The fact that the regional
manufacturing under examination is the sum of all manufacturing sectors may, in part, be
contributory factor in this respect. Certainly it is not difficult to argue from a theoretical
standpoint that sectoral composition should a significant role, as some industrial sectors are
expected to be more affected by changes in infrastructure stock levels tan others.
The results for private capital bias (KG) are all positive, which can be interpreted as public
capital being private capital using. However, here the variation amongst prefectures is greater,
in magnitude terms, than in the case of labour input. The highest factor bias effects for private
capital can be found in Lasithi (biasKG = 2.217), which has one of the highest values for
labour input. The next highest bias effect for private capital is that of Kastoria, which in
contrast is one of the lowest cases for labour. Other prefectures with high bias effects for
private capital are Fokida (1.391) and Evritania (1.005). The lowest values can be found in
Samos (0.250), Viotia (0.215), and Kozani (0.196). The last column of table 4 presents the
factor bias effects for intermediate inputs (biasMG). The sign for all prefectures is negative,
which means that public infrastructure is intermediate inputs saving. The highest savings can
be found in Thesprotia (biasMG = -0.416), Kozani (-0.335) - which has one of the lowest
effects for capital, and Grevena (-0.313). The lowest values are observed in Chania, Korinthia
(biasMG = -0.113 for both regions), Karditsa (-0.111) and Fokida (-0.110).
The cost elasticity with respect to public capital can be considered the ‘productivity’ effect of
infrastructure and, if this measure is combined with the factor bias effect, the total effect of
infrastructure on private inputs can be obtained. This measure (table 5), as indicated in section
3, is the private input elasticity with respect to public infrastructure. There is, of course, the
possibility that the two components of these elasticities - the productivity and the factor bias
effects - could offset each other, in terms of magnitude and sign. But for the Greek
prefectures, all private input elasticities have the same sign as the respective factor bias
effects. A comparison of these figures to those of table 4 shows that the demand elasticities
are determined, at least in most cases, by the factor bias effects, as the magnitude of cost
elasticities with respect to public capital are rather small. Thus, the majority of those
prefectures that have high (low) bias effects also have high (low) demand elasticities. All
prefectures have a negative sign for labour and intermediate inputs cost elasticities (eLG and
eMG respectively), and a positive sign for private capital (eKG). In economic terms this means13
that an expansion of the infrastructure stock results in a decline in the demand for labour and
intermediate inputs, and an increase in the demand for private capital input.
The prefectures with the highest labour demand elasticity are Korinthia (eLG = -0.653), Lasithi
(-0.544) and Laconia (-0.436). On the other hand, the lowest values are recorded for Drama (-
0.163), Grevena (-0.159) and Kyklades (-0.115). The second column of table 5 presents the
findings for private capital demand elasticity. Here, as for the bias effects for capital, there is a
greater spatial variation in the elasticities compared to those for labour input. The largest
elasticities were observed in Lasithi (eKG = 2.155), Kastoria (2.131 – which, in contrast, has a
low labour elasticity) and Fokida (1.326). At the opposite extreme are prefectures such as
Samos (0.185), Grevena (0.174 - which also has one of the lowest elasticities for labour),
Viotia (0.154) and Kozani (0.138). Finally, table 5 offers the demand elasticities for
intermediate inputs where the highest are observed in Thesprotia (-0.479), Kozani (-0.393),
Grevena (-0.376) and Kyklades (-0.341). Prefectures with low demand elasticities for
intermediate inputs are Korinthia (-0.178), Fokida (-0.175), Karditsa (-0.173) and Lasithi (-
0.162).
The private input elasticities with respect to public infrastructure obtained from this analysis
can be compared to those obtained from similar research. Seitz and Licht (1995) have found
that private capital (which they divide into two categories) has a complementary relationship
with public infrastructure, while labour is substitutive. This is also the case in this paper.
Similar relationships have been identified for Sweden by Berndt and Hansson (1991). Nadiri
and Mamuneas (1994), on the other hand, find that although infrastructure has a substitutive
effect for labour, in their research private capital also appears to have a substitutive
relationship with public capital, while intermediate inputs are complementary.
The final results describe the estimations of the shadow values (sGi) for infrastructure capital
in the different prefectures. Thus, table 6 shows the differences in the degree that regional
manufacturing is willing to pay in order to have an additional unit of public capital. Here, in
contrast to the other measures of the impact of infrastructure, it looks as if a clear regional
pattern emerges. There is a substantial variation in these shadow values and it seems that
those prefectures that are adjacent to the two main metropolitan areas - Athens and
Thessaloniki - have the highest shadow values. The only prefecture that is not adjacent to a
principal economic centre and has a high value is Magnesia and this contains the significant
industrial area of Volos.
6. Conclusions.
This paper presents an attempt to apply duality theory to the analysis of the impact of public
infrastructure spending on Greek manufacturing at the regional level. To undertake this task a
cost function has been specified and a panel of regional data for public capital and the private
sector employed. This simple cost function is similar to that used by Nadiri and Mamuneas
(1994) for the analysis of US manufacturing sectors, although these authors assume that there
are constant returns to scale. This assumption was tested and rejected here for the case of
productive public capital. Two alternative formulations were also tested; in the first, the
equation was calibrated without regional-specific effects; in the other, the test was whether
infrastructure should be included in the estimated system of equations. Both formulations
were rejected. As far as the other category of public capital - social infrastructure - is
concerned, it seems that this does not play a significant role in influencing the private sector.14
Some of the conclusions to be drawn from an examination of the results can be summarised as
follows. Infrastructure does have a significant and positive impact on the performance of
private manufacturing, measured in terms of the cost elasticity with respect to public
(productive) capital. It seems that public capital has a substitutive relationship with labour and
intermediate inputs, and complementary one for private capital input. Put somewhat
differently, infrastructure provision tends to save labour and other intermediate costs and it
tends to lever additional investment in the private sector.
These results are in accordance with the results of production function analysis for the same
period and same spatial analysis (Rovolis and Spence, 1997). However, a significant
limitation of the dataset employed here is that it refers to manufacturing only, and that the
latter is in aggregate form. Supplementary analysis extended to regional sectors of
manufacturing, as well as to other activities of the private sector, has not been possible due to
lack of data. Data limitations have also restricted the time dimension of this analysis to only
10 years.
As a concluding comment, one further set of findings can be reported, about which certainly
more investigation is needed. If the values for simple single factor productivity are calculated
(output per private input ratio), then these seem to be highly correlated with private input
demand elasticities with respect to public infrastructure capital. Taking labour costs first, there
is a distinct tendency for those regions with higher levels of labour productivity to substitute
more infrastructure for labour inputs. Areas with high labour productivity tend to be
associated with high negative elasticities for labour. A plausible explanation is that in remote
locations the opportunities for externalising parts of the production process are small. Add
extra infrastructure and the possibilities are raised and if taken up might possibly lead to
labour shedding. Much the same can be said for intermediate private inputs into the
production process. Conversely, there is a tendency for those regions with higher levels of
capital productivity to benefit more, in terms of the leverage of private capital, from an
additional unit of infrastructure investment. High capital productivity is associated with high
positive elasticities for capital.
                                                
i It seems that Ratner (1983) had earlier used the same analytical framework to that of Aschauer, that is to add
public capital to a production function, in the US context. Nevertheless, it most certainly was Aschauer’s work
that put the role of public capital under the spotlight.
ii  For a concise presentation of the various explanations for the productivity growth slowdown see Munnell
(1990a).
iii  W.E. Diewert not only introduced and developed some of the functional forms used in duality theory, which
still form the basis for applied research (for instance his University of California-Berkley thesis in 1969 and his
seminal article in the Journal of Political Economy (1971) „An application of the Shephard duality theorem: A
generalized linear production function“), but he also provided a cost function analytical framework for public
capital research (Diewert 1986).
iv There is, of course, the case in which the value of these services can be assessed with the use of a toll
mechanism. It is assumed here that public capital services are a free public capital good. However, the arguments
for the introduction of efficient toll mechanisms as the centrepiece of an efficient infrastructure policy are most
relevant (see Holtz-Eakin 1993a, 1993c).
v  ‘Shadow value’ is also sometimes called ‘shadow price’ (see Seitz 1994), or ‘marginal benefit’ of public capital
(see Nadiri and Mamuneas, 1994).
vi This ‘productive’ group corresponds, more or less, to the concept of ‘core’ public capital used by Aschauer
(1989a) and Munnell (1990a).
vii  As there were no available estimates of the existing capacity of public capital, the method used by Corrales
and Taguas (cited in Appendix 1 of Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero 1993) was employed. This considers the
initial year as a basis, and then builds the stock of the subsequent years on it using the perpetual inventory
method. The same methodology was employed for the construction of the private capital stocks15
                                                                                                                                                        
viii  It has to be noted here that, in the published datasets of the Statistical Service of Greece, sometimes for
certain prefectures the statistics are added together for confidentiality reasons. The dataset used here is based on
the unpublished full prefectural breakdown.
ix  For an illustration of this point see Berndt 1991, chapter 9, or Greene 1993, chapter 17.
x  Note that the estimated set of equations has been divided by the price of the intermediate goods (pm).
xi  For an extensive presentation of this method see Berndt 1991, or Greene 1993.
xii  For a more formal presentation of log-likelihood ratio test see Greene 1993. For its implementation in a cost
function analysis context see also Berndt 1991.
xiii  As there are no available data, at least on our knowledge, about the number of working hours, it has been
assumed here that all workers in manufacturing have worked the same number of working days of year, for the
same hours per day.
xiv  The published data on labour remuneration refer to the wage bill paid to workers and employees excluding the
employers’ (insurance) contributions. However, the unpublished data from the Statistical Service of Greece
provide information specifically about these contributions. There is the possibility that sectoral differences in the
level of such payments might create anomalies in relation to the data that excludes them. In this analysis both
datasets were tested and the results were similar. The subsequent results refer to the dataset including employers’
contributions.
xv  For this method of estimation of private capital price see Berndt and Hansson (1991a).
xvi  These, as well as all other, indexes and data were obtained from the Statistical Service of Greece.
xvii  Some researchers have argued that it is imperative to adjust public capital for capacity utilisation (Ford et al.
1991,Nadiri et al. 1994). In this research, however, the results with infrastructure adjusted for capacity utilisation
(these figures for Greece are available only after 1982 and obtainable from the OECD) were similar to those for
unadjusted public capital. It is the latter that are used here.
xviii  As the coefficients are divided by every year’s share in each prefecture, this means that for a specific
prefecture there will be 10 such shares. The results refer to the average for every prefecture, as well as the total
average.
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Table 1 Panel estimation results for manufacturing in the prefectures of Greece incorporating the effects of
productive public capital, 1982-1991.


















Cost function 0.996 0.113
Labour share 0.785 0.033
Capital share 0.818 0.059
Log of Likelihood 2228.86
Likelihood ratio test




aValue of Ratio of Parameter Estimate to Asymptotic Standard Error. The total number of observations is 490.
bThe associated p-values for all tests are 0.000.
Table 2 Likelihood ratio-tests for panel estimation results for manufacturing in the prefectures of Greece
incorporating the effects of social public capital, 1982-1991.
Likelihood ratio test




 Table 3 Cost elasticities of manufacturing with respect to public infrastructure capital in the prefectures of
Greece, 1982-1991.
Prefecture eCG Prefecture eCG Prefecture eCG
Achaia -0.062 Halkidiki -0.062 Magnisia -0.062
Aitoloakarnan. -0.062 Ilia -0.064 Messinia -0.061
Arcadia -0.061 Imathia -0.061 Pella -0.065
Argolida -0.063 Ioannina -0.066 Pieria -0.062
Arta -0.061 Iraklio -0.064 Preveza -0.064
Attiki -0.064 Karditsa -0.062 Rethimno -0.062
Chania -0.063 Kastoria -0.061 Rodopi -0.064
Chios -0.059 Kavala -0.061 Samos -0.064
Dodekanissos -0.061 Kerkyra -0.062 Serres -0.058
Drama -0.064 Kilkis -0.064 Thesprotia -0.063
Evia -0.062 Korinthia -0.064 Thessaloniki -0.062
Evritania -0.063 Kozani -0.058 Trikala -0.063
Evros -0.058 Kyklades -0.064 Viotia -0.061
Florina -0.063 Laconia -0.065 Xanthi -0.062
Fokida -0.065 Larisa -0.062 ZakyKepha -0.071
Fthiotis -0.064 Lasithi -0.062 Total Average -0.063
Grevena -0.063 Lesvos -0.060
Table 4 Factor bias effects over respective private input shares in the prefectures of Greece, 1982-1991.
Prefecture bias LG bias KG bias MG Prefecture bias LG bias KG bias MG
Achaia -0.165 0.285 -0.185 Kerkyra -0.188 0.455 -0.160
Aitoloakarnan. -0.184 0.602 -0.131 Kilkis -0.164 0.450 -0.145
Arcadia -0.165 0.746 -0.138 Korinthia -0.589 0.599 -0.113
Argolida -0.196 0.412 -0.143 Kozani -0.146 0.196 -0.335
Arta -0.164 0.511 -0.171 Kyklades -0.051 0.503 -0.277
Attiki -0.132 0.485 -0.153 Laconia -0.370 0.284 -0.164
Chania -0.221 0.871 -0.113 Larisa -0.161 0.387 -0.152
Chios -0.171 0.339 -0.168 Lasithi -0.482 2.217 -0.100
Dodekanissos -0.119 0.425 -0.164 Lesvos -0.173 0.797 -0.127
Drama -0.100 0.591 -0.154 Magnisia -0.226 0.348 -0.151
Evia -0.177 0.288 -0.178 Messinia -0.175 0.614 -0.130
Evritania -0.137 1.005 -0.163 Pella -0.188 0.415 -0.143
Evros -0.150 0.488 -0.152 Pieria -0.132 0.274 -0.214
Florina -0.164 0.716 -0.125 Preveza -0.147 0.599 -0.137
Fokida -0.196 1.391 -0.110 Rethimno -0.144 0.416 -0.207
Fthiotis -0.222 0.351 -0.149 Rodopi -0.167 0.296 -0.178
Grevena -0.096 0.237 -0.313 Samos -0.220 0.250 -0.197
Halkidiki -0.187 0.496 -0.133 Serres -0.170 0.535 -0.138
Ilia -0.233 0.313 -0.158 Thesprotia -0.142 0.295 -0.416
Imathia -0.197 0.569 -0.128 Thessaloniki -0.188 0.514 -0.132
Ioannina -0.232 0.401 -0.138 Trikala -0.167 0.535 -0.135
Iraklio -0.240 0.406 -0.139 Viotia -0.247 0.215 -0.225
Karditsa -0.266 0.847 -0.111 Xanthi -0.192 0.308 -0.165
Kastoria -0.113 2.192 -0.123 ZakyKepha -0.212 0.450 -0.141
Kavala -0.168 0.307 -0.174 Total Average -0.193 0.556 -0.16521
Table 5 Private input demand elasticities with respect to public infrastructure capital in the prefectures of Greece,
1982-1991.
Prefecture eLG eKG eMG Prefecture eLG eKG eMG
Achaia -0.227 0.223 -0.247 Kerkyra -0.250 0.393 -0.221
Aitoloakarnan. -0.246 0.540 -0.193 Kilkis -0.228 0.386 -0.209
Arcadia -0.226 0.685 -0.199 Korinthia -0.653 0.535 -0.178
Argolida -0.258 0.350 -0.206 Kozani -0.204 0.138 -0.393
Arta -0.226 0.449 -0.232 Kyklades -0.115 0.439 -0.341
Attiki -0.196 0.421 -0.216 Laconia -0.436 0.219 -0.229
Chania -0.284 0.808 -0.176 Larisa -0.223 0.325 -0.214
Chios -0.230 0.280 -0.227 Lasithi -0.544 2.155 -0.162
Dodekanissos -0.180 0.364 -0.225 Lesvos -0.234 0.736 -0.187
Drama -0.163 0.528 -0.217 Magnisia -0.289 0.286 -0.213
Evia -0.239 0.226 -0.240 Messinia -0.236 0.553 -0.191
Evritania -0.200 0.942 -0.227 Pella -0.253 0.350 -0.208
Evros -0.209 0.430 -0.210 Pieria -0.194 0.212 -0.276
Florina -0.226 0.653 -0.188 Preveza -0.212 0.535 -0.202
Fokida -0.261 1.326 -0.175 Rethimno -0.206 0.355 -0.269
Fthiotis -0.285 0.288 -0.213 Rodopi -0.231 0.232 -0.242
Grevena -0.159 0.174 -0.376 Samos -0.285 0.185 -0.261
Halkidiki -0.248 0.435 -0.194 Serres -0.228 0.476 -0.196
Ilia -0.296 0.249 -0.222 Thesprotia -0.205 0.232 -0.479
Imathia -0.258 0.508 -0.189 Thessaloniki -0.249 0.452 -0.194
Ioannina -0.298 0.336 -0.204 Trikala -0.230 0.472 -0.198
Iraklio -0.305 0.342 -0.203 Viotia -0.308 0.154 -0.286
Karditsa -0.328 0.785 -0.173 Xanthi -0.254 0.246 -0.227
Kastoria -0.174 2.131 -0.184 ZakyKepha -0.282 0.379 -0.212
Kavala -0.230 0.246 -0.235 Total Average -0.255 0.493 -0.228
Table 6 Shadow values of public infrastructure capital in the prefectures of Greece, 1982-1991.
Prefecture sGi Prefecture sGi Prefecture sGi
Achaia 1.098 Halkidiki 0.070 Magnisia 1.121
Aitoloakarnan. 0.090 Ilia 0.097 Messinia 0.150
Arcadia 0.056 Imathia 1.133 Pella 0.301
Argolida 0.186 Ioannina 0.134 Pieria 0.212
Arta 0.072 Iraklio 0.214 Preveza 0.084
Attiki 0.713 Karditsa 0.110 Rethimno 0.007
Chania 0.067 Kastoria 0.039 Rodopi 0.118
Chios 0.028 Kavala 0.509 Samos 0.076
Dodekanissos 0.035 Kerkyra 0.044 Serres 0.280
Drama 0.264 Kilkis 0.429 Thesprotia 0.068
Evia 1.211 Korinthia 2.645 Thessaloniki 1.093
Evritania 0.056 Kozani 0.364 Trikala 0.143
Evros 0.046 Kyklades 0.066 Viotia 1.654
Florina 0.018 Laconia 0.028 Xanthi 0.602
Fokida 0.079 Larisa 0.473 Zaky-Kepha 0.036
Fthiotis 0.934 Lasithi 0.020 Total
Average
0.353
Grevena 0.004 Lesvos 0.038